Published in 1861, Sir Henry Sumner Maine's Ancient Law is today mostly forgotten with the exception of its "law of progress": that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." 1 For Maine, "status" was the legal identity associated with continuing social relationships, such as those between master and slave or servant and between family members. These relationships carried definite rights and responsibilities that were, however, dissolving during the nineteenth century, giving rise to Maine's Whiggish "law." Yet Maine's observations would come as little surprise to Morton J. Horwitz, whose prize-winning book, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 2 showed how the common law was transformed during Maine's lifetime from a relatively egalitarian set of norms and equitable conceptions of contract to a formalistic approach that eschewed responsibilities in favor of limited contractual commitments. The new approach hastened the economic development of the United States by facilitating economic relationships and by bestowing benefits on merchants and industrialists. The transformation of employment law was less rapid; master-and-servant doctrines favoring employers held sway until late in the nineteenth century, even as the at-will dismissal rule was taking hold. corresponded to the laissez-faire doctrines espoused in the late nineteenth century by economists such as William Graham Sumner and John Bates Clark, the latter a progenitor of the new "neoclassical" approach. Yet despite the economists' enthusiasm for laissezfaire, the real world was one in which efforts constantly were being made to remedy the shortcomings of free markets and free trade. This was Karl Polanyi's "double movement," wherein the extension of an ostensibly self-regulating system of markets brought a spontaneous countermovement of efforts to repair the dislocations and defects caused by market expansion. According to Polanyi, one organizing principle of society was economic liberalism and market expansion; the other was "the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature . . . using protective legislation, 4 workers, a development that he welcomed because it gave meaning to an otherwise anomic industrial society. For others, such as labor economist Arthur M. Ross, the reduction of labor mobility associated with seniority and pensions was also a return to status, but he dubbed it more darkly "a new industrial feudalism." 6 Writing at the same time as Tannenbaum, sociologist T.H. Marshall (in lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1949) interpreted the rise of welfare-state legislation and the expansion of higher education in Britain as the completion of a process started in the eighteenth century, when individuals had acquired civil rights, followed by the attainment of political rights in the nineteenth century. Finally had come the "right to a modicum of economic welfare and security," which was based on the status of citizenship. Whereas status in feudal society had been a hallmark of inequality, citizenship in modern industrial society was egalitarian both in its rights and duties (to work and pay taxes).
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Since the 1970s, however, Maine's screw has turned again, this time in reverse.
We are now witnessing a shift from status to contract, particularly in Britain and the United States. A wave of deregulation and privatization has swept government, eroding the social rights Marshall wrote about fifty years ago. In the workplace there has been a noticeable move to more market-oriented, contractual, employment relationships. The courts have moved away from legal realism to more libertarian modes of analysis, spurred, in part, by the law and economics movement. Government policymakers too, have fallen under the sway of a new laissez-faire strain in economic analysis.
This essay surveys economic thought in Britain and the United States to assess the influence that economists have had on developments in the marketplace and in government (and also to show reverse causation; economic thinking is less free of historical circumstances than economists appreciate). Next it examines whether recent Anglo-American developments are reproducing themselves in other parts of the world, that is, whether we see synchronous swings from status to contract in continental Europe and Japan. Finally, the essay asks what the future holds in store for labor and 6 Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor (New York, 1951) . Although one might think that Tannenbaum was overly optimistic about the shortcomings of status, it should be kept in mind that his specialty was the history of slavery, with a focus on Latin America. corporations. 16 The microeconomic side, despite its seeming "value free" theories of choice and production, came with an implicit laissez-faire and utilitarian orientation.
This was most apparent in price theory (with the exception of concepts like monopolistic competition), which emphasized the superiority of markets for resource allocation. It was less visible in the most interesting microeconomic achievements of the 1950s and 1960s: rational choice theory and game theory. After all, these were highly mathematical innovations and their progenitors included scholars well known for their liberal proclivities, such as Kenneth Arrow and Jacob Marschak.
But it is well to remember that the development of rational choice and game theory was intimately related to the prosecution of the Cold War, as shown by historian S.N. Amadae. 17 The scholars who developed these theories--and mathematical techniques like linear programming and other optimization methods--were heavily funded by the Defense Department, the Navy, and the Air Force (through its RAND research center).
Rather than being a classical economic concept dating from Adam Smith, the notion of the rational actor emerged in the postwar years in part as a way of solving strategic military problems as well as ideological challenges confronting the United States.
Arrow's impossibility theorem (written while Arrow was at RAND in the late 1940s) targeted idealist concepts in welfare economics such as "the general social good" and offered in their place a kind of second best, muddling through: all public choices, whether for equity or efficiency, would always involve tradeoffs. No society could ever be perfect. bounce off the band of idealistic assumptions that lie at its core. 23 There are other substantive problems --the difficulty of internalizing negative externalities; the biases that result from using wealth rather than utility as a guide to efficient resource allocation; information scarcity that limit solutions to local rather than global maxima (and thus prone to second-best defects)--but these criticisms also have not penetrated.
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The law and economics movement has cut a wide swath through legal scholarship and decision-making, partly due to the "Pareto in the Pines" (later palms) seminars relevance to torts, it has steadily expanded to include other issues, such as labor and employment law. In Britain, law and economics is not as strong nor as Posnerian as in the United States, though it is more widely accepted in Britain than Western Europe.
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The Triumph of Neoclassicism
The collapse of Keynesianism in the early 1970s was partly a result of the intellectual assault from Chicago: the natural rate hypothesis, the rational expectations theory of Robert Lucas, and --an evocative phrase --the concept of "policy impotence."
These criticisms were well-timed, coming at precisely the moment that the economic environment had changed in ways that undercut traditional Keynesianism. The simultaneous rise of unemployment and inflation ("stagflation") was not easily accommodated by the Keynesian framework, nor was the increase in world trade and capital flows that marked a new wave of globalization. Open-economy Keynesianism existed in theory but in practice was difficult to pursue.
With the demise of Keynesianism, what was left of the neoclassical synthesis were its microfoundations, which were, by and large, ill-suited to support regulatory innovation. Without Keynes to connect economics to a progressive tradition that tried to fix market failures, the discipline increasingly embraced laissez-faire ideas. Whereas
Chicago in the 1950s had been a respected academic center but hardly the central tendency among English-speaking economists, it now dominated disciplinary discourse. Sometimes the economists took the lead in the policy arena, as was the case with sectoral deregulation. Other times--as with social security, labor law reform, and occupational safety--the impulse to privatize or deregulate initiated with industry but was blessed by economists.
Movement towards the market also occurred in less expected places. Major economists were usually unanimous in urging policymakers to proceed.
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The political influence of economists also was due to changes in government.
Policy analysis and initiation increasingly were executive functions. The White House, cabinet-level departments, and other federal agencies established in the 1970s new policy analysis units that were staffed by economists. Together with counterparts in the thinktanks and in academia, the economists constituted "an informal, professionally based network of deregulation advocates." Reliance on these analysts was viewed as a way around career specialists with more parochial views (i.e., less enamored of markets, which was taken as evidence of regulatory capture). Criticism of the new deregulatory orthodoxy was muted, as early success with the airlines cleared the way for additional
reforms.
Yet tools like cost-benefit analysis--and associated "scorecards" that purported to
show how the costs of government regulation exceeded its benefits--were not as scientific or normatively transparent as their proponents claimed. Costs were easier to quantify and monetize than benefits, resulting in biased assessments. Parallel developments occurred on the privatization front, although here Britain took the lead, partly because it had more in the way of state-owned industries to sell off (steel, gas, petroleum, telecom, energy). Just six months after taking office, Prime
Minister Thatcher initiated a public offering of shares in British Petroleum. In the United
States, privatization had more of an effect on state and local governments, chiefly in the form of "contracting out" of services to private providers of everything from prison administration to waste disposal. Vouchers, whether for housing or schools, were part of this movement, as were tuition tax credits. More recently, a combination of ideology and fiscal problems have led some states to seek privatization of core governmental functions such as policy making and program design (as in the recently proposed privatization of Texas's public-assistance system). Again, the strongest and most consistent advocates of privatization have been economists (as well as the companies seeking government contracts), an enthusiasm springing from the economists' folk wisdom that government, unlike the private sector, is "bureaucratic" and "represses innovation," and that the best criterion for judging program effectiveness is efficiency, that is to say, cost.
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What was extraordinary in all of this was the near-total absence of economic Admittedly, acceptance of progressive economic ideas in the early twentieth century was a drawn-out process that may never have happened but for the disaster that was the Great Depression. Prior to the depression, citizens had been assured that their own efforts, combined with those of paternalistic employers (so-called welfare capitalism) would be sufficient to protect them against economic risk. This turned out not to be the case and was the principal reason for the rise of the New Deal welfare state.
Moreover, the depression (like the Second World War) fostered a communitarian ethos based on the realization that all social strata were vulnerable to the same economic and military risks.
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Both politicians and economists held to the idea that slaying the twin dragons of underconsumption and business monopoly was the way to prevent future depressions. As noted, this belief invested the labor movement with a societal mission. Not only were unions viewed as a boost to consumption, they were also seen as a check on business's influence in the media and government. The public thought of unions as an embodiment of the communitarian ethos that had come out of the depression and war, despite Communism to be prosperous and free. In short, support for pluralism was a way of signaling that labor and democracy needed each other. employers reneged on security commitments to employees. This took a variety of forms:
downsizing, cutbacks in health benefits, termination of defined-benefit pension plans, and greater use of temporary and contingent employees. The reduction in employer spending on pension and health benefits was particularly critical in light of the fact that the United
States has spent more on employer-provided benefits than other nations.
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Indeed, a key element in the new individualist ethos was to shift risk from government and employers to individual employees. While those with education and "hot skills" welcomed the opportunity to be masters of their own fate--as in Silicon Valley,
The City, and Wall Street--for others the 1980s and 1990s were a time of trauma.
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Welfare state cuts--both commission and omission of benefit adjustments--hit hardest at the poor and the working poor in the United States, affecting programs like AFDC, unemployment insurance, and the minimum wage. In Britain, much the same was true:
sharp cuts for programs like public housing and a decline in unemployment-insurance replacement rates, but shelving of a proposal to privatize the National Health Service, the "third rail" of British politics. 40 The events of the past twenty years have rolled back, to varying extent, the status rights established during the 1930s and 1940s, rights that had kept markets from strictly determining one's economic fate by creating communities of shared risk--at the workplace and in the nation as a whole. The reallocation of risk, from business to individuals, and with government playing a smaller role, has been the central dynamic of Anglo-American labor markets during the past thirty years.
As during previous periods when market individualism was held up as an ideal-- One serious effect of unrectified inequality is to weaken the political influence of those in the lower half of the income distribution. A feedback is created, whereby those already falling behind are unable to prevent regulatory changes that cause them to slip even further. In the period from the 1930s through the 1970s, a different kind of feedback existed: a communitarian ethos led to public policies and wage-setting norms that reduced inequality; in turn, the reduction of inequality spurred changes that fostered egalitarian public policies. The position of the middle class relative to the poor is one of the strongest predictors of how much its GDP a nation commits to social spending.
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Now the dynamic is running in reverse, as rising inequality pulls the middle class further away from the poor. Money-driven politics reinforce this trend. As Gary Burtless and states, there is growing reliance on market incentives in the design of programs such as managed competition to pare healthcare costs.
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The receptiveness to Anglo-American neoliberalism is a sign that the coalitions which produced postwar social democracy are cracking. Postwar reconstruction is long since over, unions and churches are less influential, and immigration has changed the willingness to extend Marshall's citizenship rights to people perceived as "different."
Moreover, the strong economic performance of Britain and the United States in the 1990s as compared to France, Germany, and Japan has made credible the inference that marketoriented reforms in the former were responsible for strong growth; ergo, laggard European and Japanese economies would perform better if they adopted the AngloAmerican model. That theme is played out over and over in pronouncements from the OECD, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Economist, and other bastions of neoliberal sensibilities.
Yet the evidence suggests that Japan and Europe have thus far preferred to steer a different course. Steve Vogel's comparative study finds that European and Japanese deregulation has had the paradoxical effect of creating stronger markets but not weaker governments, giving rise to what he terms "reregulation": the formulation of more rules and government controls to manage new forms of competition (something that would not surprise Polanyi). Vogel finds this to be the case in Japan, France, and Germany with respect to deregulation of the telecom, finance, and broadcasting industries, and, to a lesser degree, of transport and utilities. Whereas the Anglo-American approach was based on the presumption that changes in competition compelled governmental disengagement, elsewhere governments held to the idea that competitive changes could best be accommodated by revamping regulation rather than eliminating it.
As for privatization of government services--whether by contracting out, vouchers, or other mechanisms--the evidence again suggests that the U.S. and, especially, the U.K., went further in this direction than other rich OECD countries. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that privatization was less a response to changing 44 Zealand, and Australia (the exception is Japan). Of the remaining 14 countries whose union density and/or coverage was stable or rising, 13 were located in Europe (the exception here was Canada). Three of those countries --Finland, Spain, and Sweden --had rising density and stable/rising coverage.
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The main public expenditure that still differentiates Europe from the United States (and Japan) is "the welfare state" --insurance plans for unemployment, health, and old age, as well as poverty-mitigation programs. In Scandinavia and rest of continental can do little more than hint at explanations. The fact that national trajectories begin at different points is crucial to the concept of "path dependence," which asserts that historical starting points, however random, have long-term ramifications for the development of economic and social institutions. Europe and Japan both went through a sequence in which big government --the legacy of monarchy --emerged before big business. As a result, the state had both the power and legitimacy necessary to direct national economic development. Not only did the state promote industrialization, it wielded regulatory powers to mobilize resources and promote industrial harmony.
German business may not have liked Bismarck's ideas about social insurance or, later on, worker committee laws (the first in 1891) but business had long experience operating in an environment where it had to defer to the state to protect its interests. This was quite different from the situation in, say, the United States, where the federal government remained relatively small and weak prior to the First World War and where business had no serious challengers to its political power and influence. 48 The fly in the ointment here, of course, is Great Britain, whose institutional sequencing was similar to the continent's, yet whose liberalism took hold at an early date.
What made Britain different was simply the fact that, when it came to industrialization, Britain was first. One of its first-mover advantages was superiority in manufacturing prowess, which caused it to press for liberalization of trade (not unlike the United States today with respect to trade in high-technology products). Compared to Britain, the continent and Japan were late developers whose governments were deeply involved in creating institutions that would promote industrialization: from state-owned industry to industrial cartels to universities to social insurance.
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Accompanying the rise of a developmental state was the proliferation of theories to justify its existence. In countries like Germany, France, and Japan, the academic study of economics was antipathetic to libertarian neoclassicism. Economists were more skeptical of markets and more focused on institutional design, an orientation that led to strong links between economics on the one hand and law, engineering, and public administration on the other. Also, because this pragmatic approach to economics eschewed neoclassicism's totalizing corpus of theory, it tended to be more eclectic, with multiple schools and movements.
In Germany, for example, the association of economics with government can be traced back to the cameralists of the eighteenth century. The cameralists were princely advisors who wrote about applied principles of economic policy and administration.
When Germany began to industrialize, their successors --the historical economists --continued the tradition of applied economics in the service of government. The historical economists were ardent nationalists, intent on using the state to devise programs that would hasten Germany's industrialization with a minimum of social friction. Hence they rejected the English liberalism (which they snidely termed "Smithianismus") in favor of protectionist policies to foster Germany's infant industries.
Although called "socialists of the chair" for their advocacy of social insurance and employee representation, they nevertheless exerted considerable influence on the conservative Prussian government. Much of their research was "institutional," often consisting of case studies intended to guide business and public policymaking. After the Second World War, an institutionalist tradition continued to influence German economics. One example was Walter Eucken's Ordnungstheorie, which stressed the regulatory principles necessary to make markets vital yet orderly. 51 Eucken neoclassical perspective at agencies like the International Monetary Fund. In recent years, the IMF has imposed strict privatization conditions on its borrowers and this has had measurable effects on the extent of privatization, especially in the form of asset sales.
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Law and Politics: A recent development in comparative scholarship is the statistical analysis of social outcomes based on a country's legal system. The assumption is that a nation's regulatory outcomes are shaped by its legal traditions. Common law countries (the Anglo-Saxon group) are more inclined to rely on juries, judicial discretion, and contractual control of business. Civil law countries (whether French, German, or Scandinavian codes) cede less autonomy to juries and judges, and control of business is more likely to occur via regulation than contract. One area where legal systems seem to matter is corporate governance: common law systems are associated with greater ownership dispersion, ostensibly because the courts early on protected investors against monarchial expropriation and this was extended to include protection from insider dealing. Investors therefore had less incentive to press for block holding as a way of monitoring business, which is the outcome observed in civil law countries that did not enforce shareholder rights as scrupulously.
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Another area where legal origin has been shown to matter is labor-market regulation.
Botero et al. measure at the national level various labor outcomes such as employment law (e.g., how strong are protections against dismissal), collective bargaining laws (e.g., how strong is the right to strike or mandated employee participation), and social security laws (including various measures of the generosity of health and pension benefits).
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When these outcomes are regressed against a country's legal system, there is a significant Canada. Even today, Canada's employment-law index ranks higher--that is, is more protective, than Sweden's, and its social-security index is higher than Germany's.) 60 There is an ahistorical quality to the Botero et al. analysis. We are never told the mechanisms through which legal origins actually determine outcomes such as socialinsurance spending. Nor is the possibility considered that a country's development is not entirely fixed at the birth of its legal system (so-called strong path dependence) but instead can be shifted during extraordinary periods --punctuated equilibria --that break the path established earlier on, as in the United States in the 1930s. Society: One thing we have learned about social insurance is that cross-class alliances are politically necessary to support redistributive schemes like public pensions and health insurance. Societies in which there is a high degree of trust and social cohesion tend to form common "risk communities" that result in higher social welfare expenditures. We also know that shared ethnic and racial identities are a powerful basis for creating these communities. 63 In the United States, among the earliest and most longlived cross-class insurance schemes were the private burial, sickness, and pension societies that existed within ethnic communities, both for immigrants from Europe as well as in African-American and Mexican-American communities. Conversely, race played a deeply divisive role in early debates over the Social Security Act and, later on, in efforts to enact the Great Society programs of the 1960s. 64 In Europe and Japan, there were fewer immigrants and few racial minorities. Ethnic uniformity sustained a sense of social solidarity across regional and economic lines. In the early days of the British welfare state, "people believed they were paying the social welfare part of their taxes to people who were like themselves." 65 Marshall's essays on citizenship were written after the Second World War, an experience that reinforced a sense of national unity. But solidarity had a darker side. Some Europeans and Japanese viewed social insurance (and related policies such as immigration law) as a way to strengthen their nation's racial characteristics. Laudable goals of uplifting the poor and building human capital occasionally transmogrified into ugly eugenic experiments to sterilize or even euthanize those with "inferior" characteristics. The European left, even including the Swedish Social Democrats, was prone to these impulses as, of course, were the Nazis.
National solidarity was not entirely a racial phenomenon nor the result of an "in one boat" mentality produced by war. Some of it drew on pre-existing status traditions in countries that were late industrializers, whether Germany, Japan, or Scandinavia. These societies entered modernity with a paradoxical combination of contract and status:
working-class protest from below and noblesse oblige from above. Of course, industrializing elites not only built upon existing status traditions but also resuscitated and adapted them to fit modern sensibilities, as with Japanese employers' "familyism"
and the nationalist concept of the kokutai. 66 In Europe, the elite's sense of responsibility for the lower classes--coupled with encouragement from the Church--made it possible to enact social-insurance legislation (the Church was especially interested in protecting mothers and families). While many in the "better" classes were put off by militant trade unionism, they had greater sympathy for craft-based or confessional unions whose focus on self-improvement and product quality resonated with guild and status traditions from an earlier era.
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When it came to organizing workers, American unions believed that ethnic homogeneity made it easier to establish solidarity. Although American unions, especially those in the AFL, were criticized for their anti-immigrant and anti-Negro attitudes, these sentiments were partly based on organizational strategies, however misguided and racist. The rise of lower-wage competition from places near (eastern Europe) and far (China) is putting pressure on European manufacturers to reduce their domestic labor costs or, if unsuccessful, to relocate production to lower-cost regions. One of the easiest ways to reduce costs is to reduce the tax burden on employers, either by cutting welfare expenditures or shifting the tax incidence from business to individuals.
In the past, industrial relations systems were premised on the idea of "taking wages out of competition" in the domestic labor market. Now the competition is transnational, at least in manufacturing, leaving unions searching for a response other than acquiescence.
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One counter-current is the transformation of the European Union from a customs zone to a transnational political entity developing a new model for promoting economic security. The European Union is seeking to bolster Marshallian citizenship rights by decoupling those rights from national territoriality and securing them at the transnational level. The new European constitution includes among its objectives a "social market economy," "full employment," and "social protection." It includes twenty fundamental social rights, such as the right to fair dismissal and the right to receive support during unemployment and old age. Left unsaid is the question of how these rights are to be actualized--especially given job competition between high-and low-wage EU countries--and how the responsibility for risk-sharing will be handled in a transnational framework.
promotes human capital investments, and reduces instability). 78 More generally, there is no conclusive evidence that government spending is associated with reduced economic performance, contra Okun's assertion. 79 Markets and laws interact in unpredictable and complex fashion. For example, the conventional neoclassical wisdom that constraints on employers such as minimum wage laws uniformly reduce employment by raising the cost of labor; this turns out, upon close empirical scrutiny, to be wrong, at least in the United States. 80 A recent paper on
European wage floors --minimum wages and contractual union rates--finds that
European employers faced with relatively high wage rates for less skilled workers will respond by investing more in employee training and physical capital to raise productivity up to levels that can sustain the higher wage floors. In the long run, this moves companies up the product learning curve and makes them less vulnerable to low-wage competition. 81 The general point is, as Wolfgang Streeck recently put it, that institutions and policies "that were clearly not created for economic reasons and with economic efficiency in mind, may turn out to be sources of superior economic performance and competitiveness." Employers adapt to these social and political constraints as they do to the constraints imposed by market competition: with creative and often beneficial innovations. 82 employed person, the picture turns even less favorable for the United States, with seven of thirteen advanced economies growing more rapidly than the United States. Of course, the latter finding is largely the result of the U.S. economy having generated more jobs, albeit at the bottom of the labor market, while Europe and Japan have endured higher unemployment combined with high productivity and wages for their employed workers.
It's a case of working smarter (but with more unemployment) versus working harder (but with more inequality). The point, however, is that nations don't have to tolerate inequality--as a result of individualistic risk-sharing--to achieve economic growth. situations where rational choice theory predicts that they will not, and that they willingly pay their share for public goods when public choice theory predicts that they are At a more practical level, the claims made in support of deregulation have turned out to be exaggerated, as has been the case with energy deregulation (California being a case in point) and privatization (whether by vouchers or by Halliburton). In Japan and
Europe, as well as in the developing world, there is now greater skepticism about radical deregulatory proposals. Even MIT economist Paul Joskow, long an advocate of deregulation, has recently expressed misgiving about diminishing returns from a narrowly neoclassical approach to regulation. He argues that too much attention has been given to the virtues of markets and not enough to the benefits of reducing transaction costs through organizations and regulation. Joskow urges that economists pursue more interdisciplinary research, and pay closer attention to institutional detail and the longterm dynamics of innovation. 89 If there is one thing to be wary of, it is the mindset that views the future as an inevitable extension of the present. When we take an historical view, we are more likely to see the possibility of unexpected changes and recurring patterns than is the case for those whose historical sensibility is inert. As Albert O. Hirschman points out, even the arguments we hear today about the futility of controlling markets through human agency are themselves forms of rhetoric that have been repeated in different voices for the past two hundred years. Since the French Revolution, reactionary pundits have claimed that efforts to empower the disenfranchised or make the poor better off either produce negative unintended consequences (the road to hell paved with good intentions) or reproduce the existing structure of power and income (through the rent-seeking behavior of putative reformists, as in public choice theory). What Hirschman calls the "rhetoric of futility" produces a suspicion of anyone and anything seeking to overturn immutable facts about human nature or the economy's natural laws. 90 Although the future is notoriously difficult to predict, I place my bets on a renewed effort to balance markets and their deficiencies. The United States may never achieve that balance in quite the same way as Europe and Japan, but neither is it likely to continue ad infinitum on its present trajectory. 90 Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
